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PARKER V. BOWRON

[L. A. No. 22294.

In Bank.

[40 U.2d

Mar. 6, 1953.)

LESTER A. PARKER et al., Appellants, v. FLETCHER
BOWRON, as Mayor of the City of Los Angeles et al.,
Respondents.
[1] Parties-Objections and Waiver-Want of Capacity to Sue.'Vhere question of capacity to sue has not been raised by demurrer or answer, it must be deemed to have been waived
and cannot be urged on appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430,
434.)
[2] !d.-Objections-Want of Capacity to Sue.-There is a distinction between incapacity to sue or a mere legal disability,
such as infancy or insanity, which deprives a party of the
right to come into court, and the right to relief, which goes
to the existence of a cause of action.
[3] Abatement- Distinctions.- An objection questioning plaintiff's right to relief or the existence of a cause of action is
not a plea in abatement.
[4] Id.-Parties-Disability.-A defense based on lack of capacity
to sue is a plea in abatement.
[5] Pleading-Demurrer to Complaint-Insufficiency of Facts to
Constitute Cause of Action.-Where a complaint states a
cause of action in someone, but not in plaintiff, a general
demurrer for failure to state a cause of action will be sustained.
[6] !d.-Waiver-Failure of Complaint to State Cause of Action.
-An objection that a complaint does not state a cause of
action in plaintiff is not waived by failure to raise it by
demurrer or answer, and may be raised at any point in the
proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 434.)
[7] Mandamus-Effectiveness and Necessity.-The granting of a
writ of mandate is discretionary and it will be granted only
where necessary to protect a substantial right and only when
it is shown that some substantial damage will be suffered
by petitioner if the writ is denied.
[8] !d.-Parties-Petitioners-Party Beneficially Interested.-A
writ of mandate will not be issued except upon affidavit on
[5] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 64; Am.Jur., Pleading, § 212.
[7] See Cal.Jur., Mandamus, § 13; Am.Jur., Mandamus, § 37.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Parties, §51; [2] Parties, § 41;
[3) Abatement, §1; [4] Abatement, §23; [5) Pleading, §91;
[6] Pleading, § 278; [7) Mandamus, § 11(2); [8, 15] Mandamus,
§ 82; [9, 10, 14] Mandamus, § 82 (2) ; [11-13, 16] Parties, § 10.
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11pplication of the party beneficially interested. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1086.)
[9] !d.-Parties-Petitioners-Special Interest.-A writ of mandate will not issue where plaintiff fails to show that it will
subserve or protect some right or interest of his, or where
it is apparent that he has no direct interest in the action
sought to be coerced, and that no benefit can accrue to him.
[10] !d.-Parties-Petitioners-Special Interest.-Petitioner, as
an individual, fails to show a proper interest to maintain a
mandamus proceeding to compel city officials to fix a salary
or wage for city employees in certain classifications at least
equal to prevailing scale for similar employment in private
industry, where he does not plead that he is an employee
of the city, nor even that he is a resident or taxpayer thereof,
and where there is no indication that any benefit could accrue to him if the writ were issued, nor that he will suffer
any detriment if it is denied.
[11] Parties-Suing on Behalf of All.-Code Civ. Proc., § 382,
authorizing representative or class suits, is basc1d on the doctrine of virtual representation and is an exception to the
general rule of compulsory joinder of all interested parties;
it is a codification of the common law theory of convenience
to the parties when one or more fairly represent the rights
of others similarly situated who could be designated in the
controversy.
[12] Id.-Suing on Behalf of All.-To authorize a class proceeding there must be a well-defined community of interest in
the questions of law and fact involved as affecting the parties to be represented.
[13] Id.-Suing on Behalf of AIL-Petitioner is not authorized
to bring a representative action on behalf of city employees
to compel eity officials to fix a salary or wage for such employees at least equal to prevailing scale for similar employment in private industry, where he does not claim to be 11
member of the interested class, there is nothing to indicate
that he is "similarly situated" with those whom he pretendR
to represent, and there can be no "common or general interest" in the subject between him, who is not employed by
city, and city employees.
[14] Mandamus-Parties-Petitioners-Special Interest.--A labor
council and its affiliated unions have no ;,;tanding to maintain
a mandamus proceeding to compel city officials to fix a salary
or wage for certain city employees at least <'qual to prevailing wage for similar employment in private industry, where
no facts are alleged which show any right or interest of

[11] See Cal.Jur., Parties, § 7; Am.Jur., Parties, § 44 et seq.
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the unions in the action sought to be commanded, there is
no indication that any benefit except possibly the incidental
one of satisfying a very small proportion of their members,
could accrue to them if the writ were issued, and they could
not suffer any detriment if it is denied.
[15] !d.-Parties-Petitioners-Party Beneficially Interested.-A
labor council is not authorized as a "party beneficially interested" within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 1086, to
maintain a mandamus proceeding to compel city officials to
fix a salary or wage for certain city employees at least equal
to prevailing wage for similar employment in private industry, where there is no statutory duty of supervision or
representation placed on such council's affiliated unions, where
they are not public boards but private organizations created
to foster diverse personal interests of their members, where
they have no legal standing as purported representatives of
city employees in negotiations with the city, and where the
city has no duty to bargain collectively or contract with the
UnlOnS.

[16] Parties-Suing on Behalf of AIL-A labor council is not a
proper party to bring a representative suit to compel city
officials to fix a salary or wage for certain city employees
at least equal to prevailing wage for similar employment in
private industry, where neither such council nor its affiliated
unions are members of the class of city employees sought
to be represented, where only a small number of members
of the affiliated unions are city employees, and where there
is no allegation that any of them is employed by departments for which the wage and salary scale is established
by the city eouncil.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Walter R. Evans, Judge.* Affirmed.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel city officials to fix a
salary or wage for all of city's employees in certain classifications at least equal to prevailing scale for similar employment in private industry. Judgment denying writ affirmed.
David Sokol and Clarence E. Todd for Appellants.
Hay L. Che:,;ebro, City Attorney (Los Angele:,;), Bourke
,Jones, Assistant City Attorney, George William Adams, Alan
G. Campbell and ,John F. F'elflmeier, Deputy City Attorneys,
for Respondents.
•·Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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~JDMONDS,

.J.- 'rhr pm·pose of this mandate proceeding

is to r-ompel tlw respondent eit.v officials to fix a salary or
11·ag·e for· all of tlw eity '~; emplor(oes iu certain elasRifications

at least eqnal to the prevailing stale for similar employment in
private inclnstry. The appeal from the judgment of dismissal
primarily presents for decision the question as to whether
the proceeding is brought by a person or persons having
the requisite beneficial interest.
According to the caption of the petition, the relief is
sought by "Lester A. Parker, individually and as a member of, and Seeretary Treasurer of, the Council of Federated
Municipal Crafts of IJos Angeles, California, a voluntary unincorporated association, and for and on behalf of the following members of said association, all of which are unincorporated labor organizations: United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, r~ocal Union No. 2231; United
Association of Plumbers and Steam Fitters, Local Union No.
78, Southern California District Council of Laborers; and
Carpenters District Council of r~os Angeles County, Petitioners.''
'rhe petition is signed by Parker as ''Petitioner'' and by
the "Attorney for Petitioners." lt is alleged that the " [p] etitioner, Council of Federated Municipal Crafts" is an unineorporated association, Parker is its secretary treasurer, certain designated unions which are unincorporated associations
are members of the council, and ''the petitioner brings this
action for and on behalf of himself individually and as Secretary Treasurer'' of the council ''and for and on behalf of''
its affiliated unions ''and the members thereof.''
The council, it is alleged, is "devoted to the improvement
of the working conditions of the members of its affiliated
unions, and to the stabilization of labor relations between the
City of and County of Los Angeles, and the employees of
said politieal subdivisions, and has as one of its aims and
objectives the establishment and maintenance of reasonable
standards for wages, hours, and working conditions of said
employees, and the maintenance of industrial peace.'' According to the pleading·, the labor council represents those
members of the affiliated unions who are working for the city
and the county. It is stated that of 2,631 members of the
United Association of Plumbers and Steam Fitters, 26 are
employed by the city; of approximately 35,000 members of
the Carpenters DiRtrict Conncil the city employs over 250;
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aud rnon~ than 1J 0 of ahout 11,000 nwmhers of: thP District
('ouncil of Lahorrn: are munieipal employee:-;.
"Yonr prtit.imwr:;: an' the r\·al parties in interest herein,"
it is said, ''sinel' they n~present a substantial part of the
employees of the City of Los Angeles; that petitioner, the
Council of Federated Municipal Crafts . . . is the collective
bargaining representative of practically every craft of employee of the City . . . as well as'' 28 listed unions. Aecordi 11g to the petition, "the sole purpose of the activities of the
petitioner, Council of Federated Municipal Crafts . . . is to
foster, promote, and develop the welfare of ·wage earners employed by the City . . . to improve their working conditions
and to advance their opportunities for profitable employment.''
Section 425 of the city charter provides: ''In fixing the compensation to be paid to persons in the City's employ, the
Council and every other authority authorized to fix salaries
or wages, shall, in every instance, provide a salary or wage
at least equal to the prevailing salary or wage for the same
quality of service rendered to private persons, firms or corporations, under similar employment, in case such prevailing
salary or wage can be ascertained.''
According to the petition, ''the respondents in fixing the
compensation paid to the members of the 'affiliated Unions'",
made a survey of salaries and wages paid by private industry
in the Los Angeles area. 'fhis survey, it is alleged, disclosed that the rates of pay in private industry were higher
than those paid by the city, "in violation of Section 425."
The "respondents," it is said, "had available data from which
it eoulcl ascertain the prevailing salary or wage paid to perRons under similar employment for the same quality of services
rendered to private persons, firms or corporations, but respondents failed, neglected and refused to pay such prevailing
salary or wages and refused to consider, or to take into consideration, such prevailing salary or wages in fixing the
salaries or wages of the earpenters, laborers and plumbers."
Tt is alleged that "demand was made on respondents that in
fixing the compensation to be paid to the members of the
'affiliated Unions' respondents provide for a salary or wage
at least equal to the prevailing salary or wage for the same
quality of service rendered to private persons, firms or corporations under similar employment; that at all times since
. . . respondents have failed and refused to do so.''
''Petitioners have no plain, speedy or adequate remedy
at law," the plea(ling· eontimlE's, "to eompel the respondents
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. . . to perform the public duty which they have under Section 425 of the City Charter . . . and there is no method except by means of this petition whereby the petitioners can
question the . . . acts of respondents and secure complete
acljmlication of their rights and adequate and complete relief." The "petitioners pray" that a writ of mandate issue
commanding the respondents to provide a salary or wage ''for
all of its employees classified as laborers, carpenters and
plumbers" at least equal to the scale prevailing in private
industry.
By ansvver, the respowlents "rleny that th<~ petitioner brings
this aetion for or on behalf of himself either indivirlually or
as Seeretary-1'reasurer of the Council . . . and deny that the
petitioucr brings this action for or on behalf of the affiliated
nnions . . . or on behalf of any members thereof or for or on
behalf of an:~;one whomsoever." It is also denied that the
eonneil "repre:,;ents or can represent any members of the said
affiliated nnions as to their wages, honrs and working conditions, or as to the Rrttlement of grievances in connection
with the rmploymrnt of any of them by" the city, connty, or
various eity ag·encies. The respondents also deny that the
council ''represents anyone collectively or otherwise either
in bargaining for wages, hours or working conditions or otherwise in resped to T1is employment by any of the said governmental entities.''
Other allegations of the answer arc that a survey was made
of salaries and wages paid in private industry. 'l'he information so obtained, it is said, together with other information. was considered by the members of the city council in
reaching the decision that the salaries and wages paid to city
0mployees are at l0ast equal to those prevailing in private
industry. According to the pleading, "none of the petitioners
is a rral party in interest hrrein, or is employed by the City
of Tjo,; Angeles, or l1as any claim herrin, nor is any of the
prtitioners the eollectivr bargaining representative of any
eruplo)·ee of" the eity or its ageneies.
By supplement to the answer, it is alleged that, since the
eommeneement of the proeeeding, the city couneil has amended
the salary standardization ordinance. As now in effect, the
ordinanee fixes inereased rates of eompensation.
TTpon the eommeneement of the trial, the respondrnts ob.ieeted to the introduetion of any evidenee upon the gronnds
"that the petitioner, Lester A. Parker, is neither a real party
in interest nor a party beneficially interested" and that the
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petition failed to state a cause of action. The court sustained
the objection upon both grounds. Judgment was entered
discharging the alternative writ, denying the petition and
ordering that "the petitioners" take nothing. The notice of
appeal recites that the "petitioners," designated in the same
manner as in the caption of the petition, appeal from the
judgment.
In the briefs upon appeal, the use of the plural designation
''petitioners'' is, for the most part, abandoned, reference
being made to the "petitioner and appellant" in most instances. However, sometimes the labor council is referred
to specifically as the petitioner and at other times the reference to "petitioner" appears to mean Parker. It is contended
that the "petitioner," apparently irrespective of whether
Parker, or the council, or the affiliated unions be so designated,
has the requisite beneficial interest and representative standing to maintain the proceeding and that the petition states
a cause of action. It is also argued that the trial court erred
in denying the "petitioner" the right to inspect the city's
survey records and to take the deposition of one Howard
E. Earl.
The respondents contend that neither the unions nor Parker,
whichever be deemed the "petitioner," is a proper party to
bring the proceeding and the petition fails to state a cause of
action. According to them, the only reasonable interpretation
of the petition is that Parker is the sole petitioner. They
also argue that the orders claimed to be erroneous are not
reviewable upon this appeal.
It is impossible, either from the caption or the body of the
petition, to determine with certainty who is intended to be
the "petitioner" or "petitioners." Apparently, it was Parker's belief that, as an individual, he could bring a representative suit upon behalf of all city employees and, as an officer
of the labor eouncil, sue on its behalf. There is some indication
that the ·named affiliated unions were not intended to bf'
petitioners, but were considered as represented by the council's
action.
The respondents argue that the council cannot be deemed
to be a petitioner because it is simply an affiliation of various
unions. No individual city employee can be a member of
the council. Also, the respondents say, neither the council
nor the affiliated unions can be a petitioner be1!ause each
is an unincorporated association incapable of suing in its own
name. The former contention raises the question of the
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eouncil 's ;;:tanding to maintain this procerding; the lattrr
•·hallrngeR tht\ <·apaeity of thr unions to sue.
[1] Insofar as thP question of capacity to R\!e is concerned, not having· been raised by demurrer or answer, it
must be deemed to have been waived and cannot now be urged
upon appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430, 434; Illopstock v.
Superior Court, 17 Cal.2d 13, 17 [108 P.2d 906, 135 A.L.R.
318].) [2] However, the question of standing to sue is
different from that of capacity. Incapacity is merely a Legal
disability, such as infancy or insanity, which deprives a party
of the right to come into court. The right to relief, on the
other hand, goes to the existence of a cause of action. [3, 4] It
is not a plea in abatement, as is lack of capacity to sue.
[5] Where the complaint states a cause of action in someone,
but not in the plaintiff, a general demurrer for failure to state
a cause of action will be sustained. (Klopstock v. St~perior
Cmtrt, supra, pp. 18-19.) [6] This objection is not waived
by failure to raise it by demurrer or answer, and may be
raised at any point in the proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 434.) Here, by the objection to the introduction of any
evidence, it has been properly raised as to whomever may
be considered the ''petitioner'' or ''petitioners.''
[7] ''The granting of a writ of mandate is discretionary
and it will be granted only where necessary to protect a
substantial right and only when it is shown that some substantial damage will be suffered by the petitioner if said writ
is denied." (Ault v. Council of City of San Rafael, 17 Cal.
2d 415, 417 [110 P.2d 379] ; May v. Board of Directors, 34
Cal.2d 125, 134 [208 P.2d 661] ; Gay v. Torrance, 145 Cal.
144, 147 [78 P. 540].) [8] "The writ of mandate will not be
issued except upon affidavit on the application of the party
beneficially interested. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1086.)" (Fritts
v. Chm·les, 145 Cal. 512, 513 [78 P. 1057].) [9] "The writ
of mandate will not issue in a case where the plaintiff fails
to show that it will subserve or protect some right or interest
of his . . . . The writ will not lie 'where it is apparent that
the relator has no direct interest in the action sought to be
coerced, and that no benefit can accrue to him from its performance.' " (Ellis v. Workman, 144 Cal. 113, 115 [77 P.
822] .)
[10] Parker, as an individual, alleg-es no facts to show
that he has any right or interest in the action sought to be
commanded. He does not plead that he is an employee of
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the city, nor (~ven that he is a resident or taxpayer of the
city. Thern is no indication that any benefit could accrue
to him if the writ were is;;;neil, nor that he will Ruffer any
detriment if it is denied.
'l'he situation is clearly distinguishable from that in Hollman
v. Warren, 32 Cal.2d 351 [196 P.2d 562], where the petitioner
was both an applicant for appointment as a notary and a
resident and taxpayer of the city and county. Under those
circumstances, the majority of the court held that the petitioner had shown a proper interest to contest the validity of
the statute under which the governor refused to consider
her application. There, the petitioner had a direct interest
in securing consideration of her application in addition to
her interest as a citizen in having a sufficent number of
notaries commissioned to serve the needs of the public. In
the present case, however, Parker cmmot benefit directly by
an increase in the pay scale of city employees. Neither has
he alleged that he is a citizen interested in having the duty
in question enforced.
Parker urges, however, that he has brought this proceeding
as a representative suit on behalf of city employees who
have a direct interest in the enforcement of the duty. He
relies upon the provision of section 382 of the Code of Civil
Procedure that, "when the question is one of a common or
general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of
all.''
[11] The statutory provision is based upon the doctrine
of virtual representation and is an exception to the general
rule of compulsory joinder of all interested parties. (Weaver
v. Pasaclen([ Tournament of Roses Assn., 32 Cal.2d 833, 837
[198 P.2d 514] .) It is a codification of "the common law
theory of convenience to the parties when one or more fairly
represent the rights of others similarly situated who could be
designated in the controversy." (Fallon v. Superior Court,
33 Cal.App.2d 48, 50 [90 P.2d 858].) [12] "[R]egardless
of which of the alternative conditions of the statute is invoked
as authorizing a class proceeding, it has been uniformly held
that there must be a well-defined 'community of interest' in
the questions of law and fact involved as affecting the parties
to be represented." (Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of
Roses Assn., sttpra; J ellen v. O'Brien, 89 Cal.App. 505, 509
[264P.1115].)
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[13] No faets have bee11 allege(! to bring Parker within
this 'noll established rule rPgarding- elass snits. He does not
claim to be a Im~mber of the interested class, and there is
nothing to indicate that he is "similarly situated" with those
whom he pretends to represeitt. '!'here ean be no ''common
or general interest" in 'the subject matter of the controversy
(Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses, supra, p. 842)
between Parker, who is not employed by the city, and city
employees. Parker cannot give himself standing to sue by
purporting to represent a class of which he is not a member.
The cases upon which Parker relies for authorization of
a representative action by an individual strengthen this conclusion. In each of them, the individual seeking to maintain the action on behalf of himself and others was a member of the class sought to be represented and raised questions
of law and fact common to himself and other members of
his class. (Wheelock v. First Presbyterian Ohun;h, 119 Cal.
477, 481 [51 P. 84lj, individual members of a church suing
on behalf of all members to recover a fund of money; Weber·
v. Marine Cooks' & Stewa1·cls' Assn., 93 Cal.App.2d 327 [208
P.2d 1009], action by group of members of union on behalf
of all members who chose to join with them for declaration
of status of constitution and by-laws of the union; Ellis v.
American Federation of Labor, 48 Cal.App.2d 440 [120 P.2d
79], members of three unions suing in a representative capacity to enjoin the revocation without a hearing of the charter
of the Central Labor Council with which their unions were
affiliated; Law v. 01·ist, 41 Cal.App.2d 862 [107 P.2d 953],
members of a group teaching theosophy seeking to enjoin
the use by a competing corporation of the name of their
society; Peterson v. Donelley, 33 Cal.App.2d 133, 136-137
[91 P.2d 123], action for an accounting and the removal of
trustees by one beneficiary of a trust upon behalf of some
3,000 beneficiaries with common interests; West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 [63 S.Ct.
1178, 87 L.Ed 1622, 147 A.hR. 674], members of a religious
sect suing "for themselves and other similarly situated" to
restrain enforcement of laws and regulations against their
sect.)
Two of the decisions cited by Parker are not in point. In
Allen v. Hotel & Restaurant etc. Alliance, 97 Cal.App.2d 343,
348 [217 P.2d 699], the court refused to consider the proceeding as a representative suit for the reason that the preliminary injunction appealed from applied only to the named
40 C.2d-12
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plaintiffs and not to the members of the class whom they
purported to represent. Dismissal of a class suit by members
of a religious sect seeking to restrain threatened criminal
prosecution was affirmed in Douglas v. Jeannette, ill9 U.S.
157, 165 [63 S.Ot. 877, 882, 87 L.Ed. 1324], upon the ground,
among others, that there was no showing of an identity of
issues between the numerous members of the class.
[14] Insofar as the council and its affiliated unions are
concerned, whether one or all of them be assumed to be the
petitioner or the petitioners, the same reasoning applies and
compels the conclusion that none of them has standing to
maintain this proceeding. No facts are alleged which show
any right or interest of the unions in the action sought to
be commanded. There is no indication that any benefit, except possibly the incidental one of satisfying a very small
proportion of their members, could accrue to them if the writ
were issued. Nor could they suffer any detriment if it is
denied. At best, they can claim to act only on behalf of
their members, since they cannot legally be affected by enforcement of the city's duty. None of the unions can have
the requisite beneficial interest in enforcing a duty owed by
the city to its employees. (Funeral Directors Assn. v. Board
of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 67 Oal.App.2d 311, 313
[154 P.2d 39] ; cf. Associated Boat Industries v. Marshall, 104
Oal.App.2d 21, 23 [230 P.2d 379] .)
[15] The council argues that it is a "party beneficially
interested'' within the meaning of section 1086 under the
rule laid down in Board of Soc. Welfare v. County of Los
Angeles, 27 Cal.2d 98 [162 P.2d 627]. That case, however,
must be limited strictly to the facts upon which it was based.
By statute, the Board of Social Welfare was "designated as
the single State agency with full power to supervise every
phase of the administration of the public assistance plans for
which grants-in-aid are received.from the United States Government in order to secure full compliance with the provisions of Title 1 and 4 of the Federal Social Security Act.''
(Welf. & Inst., Code, § 103.5.) In upholding its right to
sue, the court said: ''Generally, when a power or duty is
imposed by law upon a public board or officer, and in order
to execute such power or perform such duty, it becomes necessary to obtain a writ of mandamus, it or he may apply for
the same." (P. 101.) Because of its statutory duty, it was
held to be ''a proper party to maintain mandamus proceedings against county officials who fail or refuse to issue a war-
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rant to a needy aged person who is a member of a class entitled thereto.''
Here, however, there is no statutory duty of supervision
or representation placed upon the unions. They are not
public boards but private organizations created to foster the
diverse personal interests of their members. As purported
representatives of city employees in negotiations with the
city, they have no legal standing. The city has no duty to
bargain collectively or contract with the unions. (Nutter v.
City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 303 [168 P.2d
741].) In fact, it may not do so to the extent that the conditions of employment usually arranged by contract are covered by the provisions of the city charter. (City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles etc. Council, 94 Cal.App.2d 36, 46-47
1210 P .2d 305].) For these reasons, the unions cannot bring
themselves within the rule of the Board of Social Welfare case.
Helying upon Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Vail, 103 Colo. 364, 368-369 [86 P.2d 267], the labor council
argues that a union has sufficient interest in the enforcement of prevailing wage legislation to maintain this proceeding. In that case, a Colorado statute provided that contractors constructing public works must pay the prevailing
rate of wages to their employees. Prevailing rates were to
be stated in the invitation for bids, and disputes were to
be adjusted by the Industrial Commission. The union, which
was the collective bargaining agent with contractors for employees in the construction industry, sought an injunction
to restrain the state highway engineer from opening certain
construction bids. It claimed that the rate in the invitation
to submit bids was not the prevailing wage rate and that
the dispute should be submitted to the Industrial Commission.
At the time suit was commenced, there were neither contractors nor employees for the particular projects involved.
'rhe court construed the statutory purpose to be the avoidance
of the delays and losses which would result from wage controversies arising during the construction of public works.
It concluded that, under the peculiar circumstances existing,
the only practical solution to achieve the legislative intent
was to hold that the union had a sufficient intereflt m the
subject matter to maintain the proceeding.
The situation here is in no way similar to that in the
Denver Trades Council ease. "The labor council cannot be
the collective bargaining agent for municipal employees. In
the present case, there are employees with a present interest
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in the subject matter of the action. The city charter is
vastly different from the Colorado statute in its objective.
There is no purpose to be served by a holding that the union
may maintain the action, since a sufficient interest reposes
in others to seek compliance with the intent of the charter.
In the absence of any similarity between the facts pleaded
by Parker and the peculiar circumstances of the Denver
Trades Council case, it is not persuasive in determining the
present controversy.
Likewise distinguishable for the same reasons is El Paso
lJlclg. cf: Constr. rPrades Cmr,neil v. 1'exas Highway Corn., (Tex.
Civ.App.) 231 S.W.2d 533, 536-538, which arose upon facts
substantially similar to those of the Denver Trades Council
case and followed that decision. It is also noteworthy that
the Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Court of Civil Appeals in the El Paso case upon the ground
that the action of the highway commission was not subject
to review and refused to discuss the question of the union's
standing to sue. (Texas Highway Corn. v. El Paso Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Cou.ncn, 149 Tex. 457, 468 [234 S.W.2d 857].)
[16] Equally without merit is the council's contention
that it is a proper party to bring a representative suit.
Neither it, nor its affiliated unions, are members of the class
sought to be represented. Indeed, only a very small number of the members of the affiliated unions are city employees,
and there is no allegation that any of them is employed by
a department for which the wage and salary scale is established by the city council. For all that appears, it well may
be that none of the members of the affiliated unions is a
member of the class which is supposedly being represented.
The decisions from other jurisdictions upon which the labor
council relies as stating the proposition that a union may
maintain a representative action upon behalf of its members are not in point. United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 392 [ 42 S.Ct. 570, 66 LEd. 975],
determined that a labor union, an unincorporated association, could be sued in accordance with the provisions of a
federal statute. No question was raised as to the propriety
of the association's bringing an action in a representative capacity. In Hague v. Committee for Inditstrial Organizations,
307 U.S. 496, 514 [59 S.Ct. 954, 83 I1.Ed. 1423], the court
held that only the individual plaintiffs, and not the labor
organizations, could maintain a suit for protection of their
civil rights.
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Stapleton v. M1:tchell, 60 F'.Supp. 51, involved an action
brought by labor uniom; and inctividuals, acting in both individual and represr,ntative capacities, to test the validity
of a Kansas labor statute which purported to regulate the
activities of both the organizations and the individuals. The
unions and the individuals all had a direct interest in the
enforcement of the statute. rrhere was no question presented
concerning the right of a union to sue on behalf of some
of its members in a matter in which it had no immediate
interest. Again, in Brotherhood of S. Engineers v. City of
St. Louis, (Mo.App.) 212 S.W.2d 454, 458, the union had
a direct interest in challenging an ordinance which allegedly
deprived it of its statutory right. Thus it was permitted
to join with individual plaintiffs a number of its officers
and members, although its interest was not identical to that
of its members. There is no indication in the opinion that
it purported to act in a representative capacity.
Regardless of who may be considered the petitioner or petitioners in this case, it is obvious that none of the parties
named in the petition can have any standing to maintain
this proceeding. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider
other points presented.
The judgment is affirmed.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CAR'l'ER, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion is predicated on two propositions:
( 1) That in order to obtain relief by mandamus the petitioner
must show substantial damage, and it is discretionary with
the court whether it shall issue, and (2) petitioner has stated
no facts from which it would appear that he would benefit by
the relief sought. The remainder of the opinion consists of
setting up a row of straw men and knocking them down and
omitting an important factor.
Neither of the premises is correct. For the first proposition the majority relies upon Ault v. Council of City of San
Rafael, 17 Cal.2d 415 [110 P.2d 379], and some old cases and
erroneously cites May v. Board of Directors, 34 Cal.2d 125
[208 P.2d 661]. The May case did not hold that the remedy
of mandamus was discretionary. It held to the contrary. We
there said (p. 133): "It has been stated generally in many
decisions that whether or not a writ of mandate issues, lies
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within the difwretion of the court . . . . Yet it must be re~
n1embere<l that ''rhc \Hit must be issued in all cases where
there is not a plain, SJWf'rly, and adequate remedy, in the
ordinary course of law . . . ' (Code Oiv. Proc., § 1086), [emphasis added], and where ' . . . the petitioner has shown that
the respondents have refused to perform a clear legal dtdy not
involving the exercise of any discretion. Under such circumstances, the writ should issue.' (Betty v. Superior Court, 18
Oal.2d 619, 622 [116 P.2d 947] .) Or, as otherwise phrased,
' . . . where one has a substantial right to protect or enforce,
and this may be accomplished by such a writ, and there is no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, he is entitled as a matter of right to the writ,
or in other words, it would be an abuse of discretion to refuse
it.' " (Emphasis added.) On the other hand (necessity of
substantial damage), the rule was adopted quoting from
American Jurisprudence, " '[B]y the preponderance of
authority . . . where the question is one of public right and
the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement
of a public duty, the relator need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that
he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and
the duty in question enforced . . . . Generally, when a power
or duty is imposed by law upon a public board or officer, and
in order to execute such power or perform such duty, it
becomes necessary to obtain a writ of mandamus, it or he may
apply for the same.' " (Emphasis added.) (Hollman v. Warr·en, 32 Oal.2d 351, 357 [196 P.2d 562] .) The identical statement is made in Board of Soc. Welfare v. County of Los
Angeles, 27 Oal.2d 98 [162 P.2d 627]. It should be noted
that JYir. Justice Edmonds, the author of the majority opinion
here, dissented in the Hollman case and is here stating the
same views he expressed in his dissent there.
Attempt is made to distinguish the Board of Social Welfare
case but it cannot be done. There the state welfare board
was held to be sufficiently interested to seek mandamus to compel the county to pay aid to needy aged persons although the
state board had no authority to require the county to act.
The basis of permitting it to bring mandamus proceedings
in addition to that above mentioned was because ''Persons who
are members of such a class are ordinarily financially, and
often physically, unable to maintain such proceedings on their
own behalf, and to deny to them the assistance of the welfare
board nuder such circumstances would tend to defeat the pur-
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pose of the legislation which seeks to provide for them during
needy old age." (Board of Soc. Welfare v. County of Los
A.ngeles, supra, 27 Cal.2d 98, 100.) Here petitioner had the
specific duty of protecting the welfare of the members of the
union, including the employees of the city. It is idle to speak
of the lack of power to have collective bargaining behveen the
l'ity and the unions, as does the majority, because that is not
here involved. The members of the unions, through petitioner,
are properly aml legitimately seeking redress in the courts.
There can be no doubt of the beneficial interest of petitioner·. According to the petition for the writ, plaintiff Parker,
is the secretary and a member of the Council of Federated
Municipal Crafts of I~os Angeles, an unincorporated labor
nnion. SeYeral other named unions are affiliated with and
mem bcrs of that union and the action is brought on behalf of
all the unions and their members. The unions' purposes are
the improvement of working conditions and wages of their
members and represents such members as work for the city of
Los Angeles. It is the duty of the city council to fix the salaries
and >vages of plumbers, carpenters and laborers and in doing
so it mnst eomply with section 425* of the city charter. In
March, 1950, in fixing the wages for such employees the
council made a survey in conjunction with the eounty, eity
sehools, eounty aml city housing authority, of wages paid to
persons under similar employment for the same quality of
serviee rendered private persons, firms and corporations,
which included rlata obtained from employers in the Los
Angeles area representing the major types of industry and
business. The survey showed and it is a faet that the prevailing rate of pay in private employment for the above
mentioned work classifications is higher than the rates fixed by
the conncil. Tlms the couneil in fixing the salaries and wages
"had available data from which it could ascertain the prevailing salary or wage paid to persons under similar employment for the same quality of services rendered to private
persons, firms or eorporations, but [the eonncil] failed,
negleeted and refusi'd to pay such prevailing salary or wages
and refused to consider·, or to take 1:nto cons1:cleration, such
*''In fixing the compensation to be paid to persons in the City's
employ, the Council and every other authority authorized to fix sal~
aries or wages, shall, in every instance, provide a salary or wage at
least equal to the preYailing salary or wage fm the same quality of
serYice rendered to priYate persons, firms or corporations, under sim~
ilar employment, in case such prevailing salary or wage can be ascer~
tained. ''

360

PARKER

v.

BowRoN

[40 C.2d

prwvail,ing salary or wages in fixing the salaries or wages of
the carpente1·s, laborers and plumbers as aforesaid."
In a mandamus proceeding, on the return to the alternative writ or on the day on which the application for the writ
is noticed, the party upon whom the writ or notice is served
may answer the petition under oath in the same manner as an
answer to a complaint in a civil action. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1089.) ''On the trial, the applicant is not precluded by the
answer from any valid objection to its sufficiency, and may
connte1·vail it by proof either in direct denial or by way of
avoidance." (Emphasis added.) (Code Civ. Proc., § 1091.)
Here plaintiff made every effort when the case was called for
trial to prove facts in support of his petition and to countervail the answers but was prevented from so doing by reason
of the sustaining of defendants' objection to the introduction of any evidence; he did not rest the case on the pleadings.
Defendants seem to think that a plaintiff in a mandamus
proceeding must file an answer or reply to the answer or
return of the defendant. That is not the law. It has been
stated frequently that in mandamus proceedings the return
or answer of the defendant is accepted as true, unless controverted by petitioner. (See Htmt v. Mayor &; Cmmcil of
Riverside, 31 Cal.2d 619 [191 P.2d 426] ; Ertman v. Municipal
ConTi, 68 Cal.App.2d 143 [155 P.2d 908, 156 P.2d 940] ;
Vanderbttsh v. Board of Public Works, 62 Cal.App. 771 [217
P. 785]; McClatchy v. ~Matthews, 135 Cal. 274 [67 P. 134];
Lo'velancl v. City of Oakland, 69 Cal.App.2d 399 [159 P.2d
70] ; Pox v. W orkrnan, 6 Cal.App. 633 [92 P. 742] ; Brown
v. 8nperior Cou1·t, 10 Cal.App.2d 365 [52 P.2d 256] ; Charles
L. Donohoe Co. v. 8uperim· Court, 79 Cal.App. 41 [248 P.
1007]; Friedland v. 8ttpen'or Cmtrt., 67 Cal.App.2d 619 [155
P .2d 90 ]. ) And a petitioner may file an answer or reply to
(lpfendant's answer or return. (Scott v. Superior Court, 205
Cal. 525 [271 P. 906] .) That does not mean, however, that
a reply to defendant's answer must be filed. That plaintiff
may controvert the answer by proof-by evidence- is the plain
meaning of section J 091 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
supra. 'rhc foregoing authorities were dealing with situations
where the <lcterminatiou of the matter was sn bmittecl by the
parties on the pleading:,; alone o1· one of the parties made a
!llotion for judgment ou the plt>adings. The question of
wh(other or not defendant's answer conld be eontroverted by
proof without filing a reply or answer to the answer was not
presented in any of the cases above cited and it clearly appears
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from most of them that by reason of section 10!11, supra,
plaintiff eollld mee1 tbe allegations in the answer by either
pleading or proof. (ll1 cGlatr:hy v. Matthews, supra, 1::!5 Cal.
274; Vander-bush v. Board of Public 1Vor-ks, supr-a, 62 Cal.
App. 771; Loveland v. City of Oakland, supra, 69 Cal.App.
2d 399; Pox v. W orkrnan, supr-a, 6 Cal.App. 633; Charles L.
Donohoe Co. v. Superior- Court, supra, 79 Cal.App. 41; Friedland v. 8nperim· Court, supra, 67 Cal.App.2d 619.)
Since plaintiff was entitled to countervail defendants'
answer by proof, though they filed no reply thereto, the denial
of a right to put in any evidence, was prejudicial error.
Hence, if the facts as alleged in the petition state a cause
of action the proceeding should not have been dismissed.
Plaintiff Parker brings the action individually and as
secretary of the Council of Federated Municipal Crafts of
I,os Angeles, an unincorporated union, referred to as union,
having as its members various other unincorporated unions,
called affiliated unions. II e alleges that he brings the action
on behalf of himself 1:nclividually and on behalf of the affiliated
unions and the members thereof; that the union is devoted to
the improvement of working conditions and wages of the members of the affiliated unions and they have authoTizecl the union
to represent them in achievmg those ends; that members of
those unions work for the city.
It thus clearly appears that plaintiff is acting, in effect,
as the authorized agent or representative of the members of
the affiliated unions, some of whom are city employees, inasmuch as he is an officer and representative of the union which in
turn represents the members of the affiliated unions. It cannot
be doubted that the members of the affiliated unions, who are
employed by the city, are definitely beneficially interested in
having their wages and salaries meet those paid in private
employment as required by section 425 of the charter, supra.
The action was properly instituted by Parker as a member of the unions and their members. The union as such
operating in Los Angeles has a substantial interest in the
wages paid to all in the class of craftsmen, of which the memberships of the affiliated unions consist, whether they are
members of the latter or not; siinilarly each member of the
union has an interest in that matter. They have an interest
in what the city pays such craftsmen, because what one employer pays his employees has an impact on what another pays
or will pay. The phrase "beneficially interested" person who
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may apply for a writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086)
is given liberal construction.
Moreover, a proceeding is maintainable by Parker as an
officer and member of the union and agent and representative
of the members of the affiliated unions, including members
who work for the city. The . interest of such members is
common. He would be beneficially interested because those
on behalf of whom the proceeding was maintained would have
the interest. This is necessary because of the impracticability
of all the members joining and the inability of the unincorporated unions to prosecute the proceeding as an association. It is said: "Where there is no statutory authorization
of suits by or against an unincorporated association in the
association name, the remedy, when a cause of action for
or against an association exists, is by an action in the names
of the several persons constituting the association, or in the
name of a trustee or trustees in whom some right of property
is vested or who is specially mdhorized to sue. . . . The doctrine of virtual representation, which recognizes the right of
a few persons to sue or defend on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, has frequently been applied in
the case of actions by or against voluntary unincorporated
associations; and it is well settled that where the members
of such an association are too numerous to be joined in the
action, or where the society is composed of very many members, one or more of the members may sue on behalf of all
the interested parties. . . . Under this general rule, a suit
may be brought by the officers of the association or a committee appointed or authorized to prosecute it." ( 4 Am.J ur .,
Associations and Clubs, §§ 48, 49.) Our law provides that
''when the question is one of common or general interest,
of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it
is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or
more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." (Code Civ.
Proc., § 382.) That provision applies to actions at law as
well as equity ( W eave1· v. Pasadena Tottrnament of Roses
Assn., 32 Cal.2d 833, 837 [198 P.2d 514] ), and in regard to
proceedings such as mandamus ''except as otherwise provided
in this title (under which mandamus falls), the provisions of
part two of this code (the part in which section 382 appears)
are applicable to and constitute the rules of practice in the proceedings mentioned in this title." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1109.)
In Funeral Directors Assn. v. Board of Funeral Directors
&; Embalmers, 67 Cal.App.2d 311 [154 P.2d 39], it was held
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that a nonprofit corporation of funeral directors composed
of persons in that business had not sufficient interest to annul
by mandamus an order of the State Board of Funeral Directors granting probation to a licensee whose license it had revoked. In Associated Boat Industries v. Marshall, 104 Cal.
App.2d 21 [230 P.2d 379], it was held that a nonprofit corporation whose members consisted of those in certain industries who were affected by an administrative regulation had
not sufficient interest to attack it in an action for declaratory relief under Government Code, section 11440, authorizing such action by any interested persons. Assuming the
correctness of those decisions they did not involve a public
duty of general public importance, such as section 425 of the
charter, supra, nor were the associations unincorporated and
thus without right to sue.
It is defendants' position that a court will not intervene
in this dispute because an ordinance fixing the salaries and
wages is legislative and its determination that the salaries
fixed are in accord with prevailing rates cannot be questioned
except for fraud or corruption; that section 425 of the charter, supra, is directory only.
In City & County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d 685
[140 P.2d 666], this court considered the charter of the City
and County of San Prancisco which placed the duty to fix
salaries and wages on the board of supervisors. It was the
duty of the civil service commission to make an investigation and prepare a schedule of rates to be submitted to the
board and (p. 688) : ''The compensations fixed as herein provided shall be in accord with the generally prevailing rates
of wages for like service and working conditions in private
employment or in other comparable governmental organizations in this state." The salaries and wages fixed thereunder were attacked as being in excess of the prevailing rate
elsewhere. It was held that (p. 690): "The determination
whether proposed rates of compensation are in accord or in
harmony with generally prevailing rates is within the diseretion of the rate-making authority. The courts will not
interfere with that determination unless the action is fraudulent or so palpably unrrasonable and arbitrary as to indicate an abuse of discretion as a matter of law," and (p. 692)
''an ordinance is invalid if the mandatory prerequisites to
its enactment are not substantially observed." Also, it is
implicit in that decision that the charter provision imposed
a mandatory duty on the board to adopt a prevailing com-
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pensation rate and it has been so interpreted (Adams v. City
& County of San Francisco, 94 Cal.App.2d 586 [211 P.2d 368,
212 P.2d 272] ; see Adams v. Wolff, 84 Cal.App.2d 435 [190
P.2d 665]). Section 425 here involved is substantially the
same as the court considered in City & County of San Francisco v. Boyd, supra, 22 Cal.2d 685, hence it is not necessary
to rely upon Adams v. Wolff, supra, 84 Cal.App.2d 435, where
the court dealt with an amended version of the San Francisco charter provision. It is clear, therefore, that section
425 is mandatory.
Defendants contend the standard fixed by section 425 is
general and vague, leaving complete and unbridled discretion
in the council. It is true that such phrases as ''quality of
service'' and ''similar employment'' are general and flexible
leaving much for determination by the council but a ''reasonable or just'' correspondence between the rates paid by
private industry and the city is to be ascertained. I do not
take the same "quality" of service to mean of the same competence or perfection. While that is one of the definitions
of "quality," it also means of the same class or nature of
service, such as a carpenter. (Webster's Int. Diet., 2d ed.,
p. 2031.) The prevailing rate may be ascertained and it
is done in many cities.
The question is, therefore, whether the city's action was
''fraudulent or so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to
indicate an abuse of discretion." (City & County of San
Francisco v. Boyd, st~pra, 22 Cal.2d 685, 690.) I believe the
petition is sufficient on that point without reaching the question
of whether there was an abuse of discretion in fixing the
amount of the compensation as compared to that paid in
private industry. It will be recalled that it is alleged in the
petiti(m, qnoteel supra, that although defendants had the
<'lata of wage rates in private industry and also government
11nits, they refused to give any consideration to it in passing
the ordinance. They refused to consider the most cogent
eYic1enee ayailable, condnct which would constitute a denial of
clue process in a judicial proceeding. Certainly such refusal
was arbitrary under the test stated in the Boyd case, supra.
Furthermore, the compensation fixed may be so completely
ont of line with that prevailing in private industry that the
action of the council would be arbitrary and palpably unreasonable under the test stated in City & County of San Francisco v. Boyd, supra, 22 Cal.2d 685. A provision such as
section 425 of the charter is, in the language of Justice Car-
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dozo used when he Wll$ Chief ,Tustice of the New York Court
of Appeals, " . . . an attempt by the state (the people of
the city here) to hold its territorial subdivisions to a standard
of social justice in their dealings with laborers, workmen, and
mechanics. It is to be interpreted with the degree of liberality
essential to the attainment of the end in view." (Austin v.
City of New York, 258 N.Y. 113 [179 N.E. 313, 314).) The
charter of a city within its proper field is the city's constitution (Adams v. Wolff, supra, 84 Cal.App.2d 435) and
the council, the legislative body, must comply with it. It is
generally true that the courts will not interfere with a legislative process or determination (see Johnston v. Board of
Supervisors, 31 Cal.2d 66 [187 P.2d 686); Santa Clara County
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.2d 552 [203 P.2d 1]) yet: '"l'he
character of the action of the city council, called generally the
legislative body, in a particular case depends on the nature of
the act or duty and the provisions of the statute under which it
is performed. Here the statute makes the distinction between
non-legislative and legislative action by directing exercise of
the latter function only when the protests are shown to be
insufficient.
''This court in other cases has recognized the division between the administrative or other nonlegislative function preceding the performance of the legislative act where constitutional or statutory requirements were involved. (McFadden
v. Jordan, 32 Cal.2d 330 [196 P.2d 787]; Gage v. Jordan,
23 Cal.2d 794 [147 P.2d 387); Epperson v. Jordan, 12 Cal.2d
61, 64 [82 P.2d 445] and cases cited.)" (American Distl.
Co. v. City Cowncil, Sattsalito, 34 Cal.2d 660, 665 [213 P.2d
704, 18 A.L.R.2d 1247].) In the Sausalito case the precedent
fact to be found by the council was whether protests to
annexation by a city of additional territory were filed by the
owners of more than 50 per cent of the property in the
territory. If there were sufficient protests the territory could
not be annexed; if insufficient an ordinance of annexation
could be considered by the council. Here the city's constitution (charter) expressly imposes upon the council the duty
of ascertaining the rates of compensation in private industry,
a specific factual matter. A specific test with which the
ordinance must comply is established. If perchance the
prevailing rate in private industry cannot be determined
which is very doubtful, then it is excused from the requirement
by the last phrase in section 425. While it does not expressly
provide that it shall first make a finding on that question
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(and perhaps hold hearings in aid thereof) before it passes
an ordinance fixing its employees' compensation, the clear
implication is that such a determination must be made either
before or at the time of the adoption of the salary ordinance.
Indeed the charter provides that the council and other authority authorized to fix salaries shall appoint a representative
to the salary standardization committee (the director of the
budget is also a member) which grades and regrades the
salaries of all classes of employees so that like salaries shall
be paid for like duties and makes its recommendation to the
council. (L.A. Charter, § 123.)
The facts alleged are sufficient to state a case. It is charged
that the council failed and refused to consider the surveys
made by it; that according to the surveys and the city's rate
of compensation the following appears: plumbers: survey
$435 per month, city pay $303 to $375 graduated according
to the years of service up to five years with the city; carpenters: survey $369 (now $382) per month, city pay $259
to $319 similarly graduated; laborers: survey, $273.18 (now
$287.10) per month, city pay $181 to $221, similarly graduated. \Vhether there are factors which would defeat plaintiff's
claim of similarity of work and pay in private industry or
his other allegations is a matter that should be determined
on a trial.
The survey above mentioned was made jointly by the city,
Los Angeles County, school district and housing authority.
Plaintiff obtained a subpoena duces tecum ordering Howard
E. Earl to produce at the taking of his deposition the survey
and data upon which it was based. Earl's move to quash the
subpoena was granted as to the deposition but as to trial he
was required to attend and bring the papers except those
parts showing the names and identities of the persons from
whom the data was obtained. Apparently, Earl is the assistant chief administrative officer of Los Angeles County
and had charge of making the survey. Plaintiff moved for a
reconsideration and an order permitting him to inspect and
copy the survey. This was denied. Plaintiff complains,
on this appeal from the judgment, of those denial orders as
being erroneous. Defendants reply that those orders were
intermediate and do not affect the judgment or plaintiff's
rights and are thus not reversible on appeal from the judgment; further, that as plaintiff took no exception to them
he has waived any objection to them.
It should be observed that the ground for quashing the
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subpoena for the deposition and in part for the trial was
because of the claimed confidential character of the names and
identity of the employers from whom the data was obtained,
a question considered by this court in City & County of San
Francisco v. Superior Cottrt, 38 Cal.2d 156 [238 P.2d 581].
It was there held that the right to inspect public records
(Gov. Code, § 1227; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1888, 1892), did not
extend to confidential records under Code of Civil Procedure,
section 1881 ( 5), and that the names and identity of the employers furnishing data to the official for ascertaining the
prevailing wage rate could and should be withheld. The case
refrained from deciding what effect, if any, the withholding
of such information would have upon proceedings in mandate
attacking the rate of compensation fixed by the city. On
that basis alone a portion of the orders of denial could be
found valid. Thus the motion for an order to inspect and
copy the survey should have been denied insofar as the insprction extended to the names and identities of the employers
giving information and the information given by particular
employers, but the right to inspect the survey insofar as it
related to the method used, the qualifications of the persons
making it, all of which were requested by the motion, is clear.
Under section 1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure an
order may be obtained on motion to inspect and copy any
paper containing material evidence and in the possession or
control of the other party. No appeal lies from an order
granting or denying a motion under section 1000 for it is
not a nnal order or judgment in a collateral matter and is
not listed as an appealable order in section 963 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. (See Collins v. Corse, 8 Cal.2d 123 [64 P.2d
137} ; Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 4 Cal.2d 541
[51 P.2d 81]; Franchise 'Tax Board v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.
2d 538 [225 P.2d 905}; Estate of Brady, 32 Cal.2d 478 (196 P.
2d 881].) While mandamus will lie to attack the order (Austin
v. 'l'1trrentine, 30 Cal.App.2d 750 [87 P.2d 72, 88 P.2d 178])
such order may be reviewed on appeal from the judgment
because it "substantially affects the right of a party." (Code
Civ. Proc., § 956.) The granting or denial of a motion to
quash a subpoena is not appealable and may be attacked by
mandamus ( Wemyss v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 616 [241
P.2d 525]), and is reviewable on appeal from the judgment.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 956; Brou·n v. Snperim· Court, 34 Cal.2d
559, 562 [212 P.2d 878}; see McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 26 Ca12d 386 [159 P.2d 944].)
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I refer to the orders of denial of the right to inspect in
part and quashing of the subpoena in part as affecting the
substantial rights of a party. Clearly they do, because one
of the very questions at issue is whether the council acted
arbitrarily, and necessarily involved therein were the surveys
made and the method of making them. Hence, insofar as
plaintiff was deprived of his right to take the deposition and
inspect the surveys, accepting the names and identity of the
employers furnishing data and the rate of compensation of
particular employees, the trial court was in error. It is not
necessary to decide whether it was necessary for plaintiff
to take exception to the orders because the judgment should
be reversed on the grounds heretofore mentioned.

[L. A. No. 21347.

In Bank.

Mar. 10, 1953.]

SEVEN UP BOTTI.JING COMPANY OF LOS ANGELES
INCORPORA'I'ED, Appellant, v. GROCERY DRIVERS
UNION LOCAI1 848 (an Unincorporated Association)
et al., Respondents.
[1] Appeal-Scope and Extent of Review-Pleadings.-Where proceedings on a preliminary injunction are separate from those
leading to a judgment of dismissal on ground that complaint
does not state a cause of action, and an appeal is taken only
from such judgment, the court on appeal will not consider
affidavits presented in connection with such injunction but
will consider only the complaint,
[2] Labor-Jurisdictional Strike Law-Activities Prohibited.-Alleged activities of defendant labor organizations consisting
of concerted interference with plaintiff-employer's business
arising out of a controversy between defendants and another
labor organization, which had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with plaintiff, as to which of these organizations should have exclusive right to bargain collectively
with plaintiff, fall within terms of Jurisdictional Strike Act.
(Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120.)
[3] Id.-Pleading.-In employer's complaint against labor organizations for violation of Jurisdictional Strike Act, an inference that the cause of defendants' concerted activities or
picketing was a dispute between them and another labor orMcK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 966; [2, 7, 9]
Labor, §21; [3] Labor, §27; [4,6] Labor, ~23; [5] Labor, §25;
[8] Labor, § 20a.

